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ABSTRACT Over the last decade, the Communist Party of NepalMaoists Center
(CPNMaoist Center) has suffered from fragmentation. Currently led by Prime
Minister and chairman Prachanda, tensions within the CPNMaoist Center have
resulted in former CPNMaoist Center chairman Mohan Baidya splitting with the party
in 2012, followed by former Prime Minister Dr. Baburam Bhattarai in 2015. Prachanda,
Baidya and Bhattarai, who are credited for igniting the Maoist People’s War
(19962006), now lead three separate political factions within parliament. Standard
explanations for the splits point to ideological differences as the basis of the splits, due
to the CPNMaoist Center’s history of factionalism along ideological lines. This study
investigates the conditions which led to the splits between Maoist War leaders
Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, examining the extent of which these splits are a
product of ideological differences.
KEYWORDS: Maoist ● political parties ● factionalism
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Introduction
The Communist Party of NepalMaoist Center (CPNMaoist Center) has a turbulent
history of internal party conflict. Led by Prime Minister and chairman Pushpa Kamal
Dahal (better known by his nom de guerre “Prachanda”), the CPNMaoist Center has
suffered a series of party fractures, with a number of academics attributing the party’s
division to ideological differences amongst leaders. In 2015, former Prime Minister Dr.
Baburam Bhattarai1 (20112013) split with the CPNMaoist Center, to form his own
political party, Naya Shakti Nepal (NSN) (which translates to “New Power Nepal”)
(Himalayan Times 2015a; Agence FrancePresse 2016). Before Bhattarai, former
CPNMaoist Center senior vice chairman Mohan Pokharel Baidya (nom de guerre
“Kiran”) left the party in 2012, forming the Communist Party of NepalRevolutionary
Maoist (CPNRevolutionary Maoist) (Aashar 2012). Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya,
who are credited with launching the Maoist People’s War2 against the Parliamentary
Democracy in 1996, now all stand divided (Dixit 2012). Owing to these splits, the
CPNMaoist Center has suffered major setbacks in national politics, losing the
government majority in the 2014 Constituent Assembly elections, reducing the party’s
national standing to third and weakening the party structurally (Upadhyay 2014).
The CPNMaoist Center has had many vital successes as a party. In 2006, ten
years after launching the People’s War, under the military leadership of Prachanda and
the guidance of communist ideologues Bhattarai and Baidya, the CPNMaoist

1

After the formation of Naya Shakti Nepal, Bhattarai publicly renounced his nom de guerre,
“Laaldhwoj” (which translates to “carrier of red flag”) (Himalayan Times 2016c).
2
The People’s War was fought from 1996 to 2006 (Basnett 2009).
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Center—formally

known then as the Communist Party of NepalMaoist

(CPNMaoist)—was successfully able to end the the 240yearold Hindu monarchy
(British Broadcasting Corporation 2013; Upadhyay 2014; Himalayan Times 2016a).
Thereafter, parliament declared Nepal to be a federal democratic republic (Thapa and
Sharma 2009). Subsequently, during the postwar elections of 2008 the CPNMaoist
Center was able to garner the majority vote from the public, winning 120 out of 240
(firstpastthepost) parliamentary seats, thus assuming power (Agence FrancePresse
2016; Election Commission of Nepal 2008). Despite this outcome, the CPNMaoist
Center has been unsuccessful in altering the historical relations of multilayered
oppression in Nepal—the motive force behind the decade long war—with former
CPNMaoist Center leaders Bhattarai and Baidya, establishing new political forces
(Dahal 2008).
Since the signing of the peace accord between the Maoists and government in
2006, the future state of the Maoist movement and the nationstate of Nepal, has
troubled a number of academics and policymakers alike. Given the historical
denouncements from Maoist communist parties in Nepal, the standard explanation for
why Bhattarai and Baidya split with the Prachandaled CPNMaoist Center is largely
attributed to ideological differences between the leaders (Sharma 2016; Thapa 2003).
However, both Bhattarai and Baidya are known as the ideologues of the party, with all
three leaders sharing a common agenda during the insurgency (Thapa 2003; Adhikari
2014). These causal explanations do little to illuminate neither why they choose to split
(Mishra 2008; Lawoti 2009).
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This study investigates the conditions which led to the recent splits between
Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, the orchestrators of the Maoist People’s War.
Through a combination of literature review and personal interview surveys, this study
examines the extent to which these splits are a product of ideological differences.
The structure of this study is organized as follows; section one is dedicated to
contextualizing the study and providing the historical background of the CPNMaoist
Center. This is followed by a review of literature on the Maoist Movement in Nepal,
factionalism within the CPNMaoist Center and political happenings in Nepal. In section
three, research methodology and method of data analysis are detailed. Subsequently,
research findings and analysis are presented. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my
research, with the hopes that this study contributes to the greater understanding of the
splits between Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, factionalism
within the CPNMaoist Center and Nepal’s domestic political situation.

❖

Historicising the Communist Party of NepalMaoist Center

Understanding the factionalism within the CPNMaoist Center and recent splits
between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya requires a recognition of the conditions from
which the party emerged. The original Communist Party of Nepal3 (CPN) was formed
in 1940. Yet, the origins of the communist movement led by the CPNMaoist Center4
extend back to the late 1960’s. At that time, political parties were banned in Nepal and
the country was ruled by King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev (19551972) through

3

The presentday Prachandaled Communist Party of NepalMaoist Center’s roots trace back to
the original Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) (Thapa 2003).
4
During this time, the CPNMaoist Center was still formally named the Communist Party of Nepal.
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the Panchayat raj 5 system. However, the CPNMaoist Center still remained active
underground. Later, due to ideological differences the CPN split vertically along party
lines: proSoviet vs. proChinese groups. During that time, the communist movement in
Nepal was in chaos with various groups organizing on their own, many leaders either in
jail or exile in India. After a failed armed uprising was attempted by a group of young
rogue communist working in Jhapa district (in 1971), some of the old guard—many
newly released from prison—tried to reestablish order to the communist movement,
marred by factionalism. In 1974, the old guard came together to hold Communist Party
of Nepal’s Fourth Congress (CPNFourth Congress), which would later grow into a
party under the same name, becoming an essential force within the communist
movement over the next decade. In 1983, due to innerparty disagreements over who
the main enemy of the party was, the CPNFourth Congress split leading to the
formation of the Communist Party of NepalMasal (CPNMasal). In 1985, the
Bhattarailed CPNMasal underwent further division, resulting in the formation of the
Communist Party of NepalMashal (CPNMashal) led by Baidya. In 1989, Prachanda
would assume leadership from Baidya, becoming the general secretary of the faction
(Thapa 2003; Upreti 2008).
During the 1990’s, the CPNFourth Congress and other communist groups
unified to fight the Panchayat system, forming the United Left Front (ULF). After
toppling the Panchayat system, smaller parties within the ULF quit the Front in protest,

5

Panchayat raj which translates into “rule of five assembles,” was the political system of Nepal
from 1960’s to 1990’s. In Nepal, the panchayat system had four tiers, functioning at the village,
town, district and national level. Traditionally, each castegroup in Nepal would form its own
panchayat or council of elders, with a portion of the assembly members being chosen by the next
tier panchayat, to serve in the following tier panchayat (Savada 1991).
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finding their input suppressed within the coalition. One of the parties to leave the ULF
coalition was the CPNFourth Congress, forming a new alliance with the Prachandled
CPNMashal, creating the Communist Party of NepalUnity Center (CPNUnity
Center).
Nineteen ninetyone marked the first multiparty election held since the people’s
movement against the Panchayat system. Under the banner of the United People’s
Front (UPF), the CPNUnity Center decided compete in the polls, as an attempt to
reach a larger audience, while also using the elections as a forum to critique the
parliamentary system. To much surprise, under the banner of the UPF the CPNUnity
Center won nine seats. However, this victory was shortlived. In 1994, the party split
between a Prachandaled faction which championed for an armed uprising and one
which pushed for a more cautious path to revolution. This breakup was reflected in the
national political front of the UPF, as both factions contended for recognition from the
election commissions. The Bhattarailed faction of the UPF aligned with Prachanda and
Baidya. In turn, they were denied recognition by the election commission, boycotting the
1994 elections in response. In March of 1995, the Prachandaled CPNUnity Center
faction renamed itself the Communist Party of NepalMaoist (CPNMaoist), formally
adopting the doctrine of armed struggle, following the revolutionary ideology of
MarxismLeninismMaoism6 (MLM) (Thapa 2003).

6

Also known as “Prachanda Path.”
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Literature Review
Despite their extensive history of party division, the CPNMaoist was still able to secure
the parliamentary majority in the postwar elections of 2008 (Thapa 2009; Agence
FrancePresse 2016). The overwhelming public support of the Maoist was attributed
their ability to mobilize support, through their strategic use of communist ideology which
centered the rights of marginalized groups (ie.women, indigenous nationalities and Dalit 7
). Through conducting political education which challenged traditional norms and
practices which reaffirmed social hierarchies, the Maoist enabled oppressed groups to
imagine a revolutionary alternative to their oppression. By recognizing the plight of
marginalized groups, the Maoist were not only able to incorporate “fluid groups” like the
Dalit , indigenous nationalities, women and unemployed youth into the armed struggle,
but win the support of the public which transferred to the 2008 elections (Lawoti 2009;
Basnett 2009).

❖

PostInsurgency Unification Process

After winning the parliamentary majority in 2008, there seemed to be a consensus
amongst CPNMaoist leaders that mass party unification was needed to ensure that
their goal of establishing a socialist people’s republic of Nepal succeeded. At this time,
Prachanda was credited for unifying several communist party splinters, forming the
SevenParty Alliance (SPA). The mission of the SPA was to form a consensus
government after the 2008 constituent assembly, working together to write a new
constitution “that would pave the way for a people’s republic, socialism and

7

In the Hindu caste system, Dalit or “broken people,” are regarded ritual impure, occupying the
lowest position in the caste system (Dalit Solidarity 2016).
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communism” (Lawoti 2009; Himalayan Times 2008; Mishra 2008). In 2009, after a
joint meeting of CPNM and CPNUnity Center central committee members was
called, they decided to name the new alliance the Unified Party of Nepal
CommunistMaoist (UCPNMaoist) (South Asian Terrorism Portal 2016). However,
this period of unification was short lived.

❖

BaidyaPrachanda Split

With Baidya choosing to leave the UCPNMaoist in 2012—taking along 45 of 149
central committee members—attempts of mass party unification were halted (Aashar
2012). Baidya ascribed the splits to the UCPNMaoist party’s leadership, which had
“‘annihilated the achievements’” of the decade long’s People’s War. According to
Baidyaallied breakaway faction leader Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma: “‘When
[UCPNMaoist] entered into [the] peace [agreement], there was a challenge to retain
the party’s revolutionary spirit. Until a couple of years ago, Prachanda was clearly allied
with us, but he deviated from it. After all shorts of attempts, we concluded that there’s
no alternative but to form a new party’” (British Broadcasting Company 2012).
Baidya’s faction has dubbed Prachanda and Bhattarai—who at the time was serving as
Prime Minister—as “Red Traitors” and “NeoRevisionists,” accusing them of
“compromising on the objectives of the People’s War” (Ghimire 2012). Baidya’s
criticism stemmed from Prachanda’s and Bhattarai’s failures to produce a new
constitution in the mandated period. The constitution was supposed to serve as a
stepping stone, putting the Maoist a little bit closer to establishing a people’s republic.
Yet, before the signing of the current constitution, Prachanda shifted party lines, aligning
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himself with the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of NepalUnified
MarxistLeninist (CPNUnified MarxistLeninist). As a result, the document reversed
many of the party’s achievements on inclusion (Jha 2016). Baidya’s criticism also
stemmed from Prachanda failing to “ensure that former Maoist fighters were integrated
into the army ‘in a respected manner’” (British Broadcasting Company). After declaring
his split, Baidya called for “revolutionary forces” to join his new party calling it “a
beginning of a new chapter in the country” (British Broadcasting Company 2012).
When Baidya declared his split from the CPNMaoist Center8 and the
formation of his new party, he claimed that unity with the UCPNMaoist was still
possible if Prachanda and Bhattarai corrected their past mistakes. Years since the split,
Prachanda has reached out to Baidya’s party in attempts to reunify. Baidya, hesitant to
reunite with the CPNMaoist Center, cited ideological differences as the reason. In a
sixpage appeal to the Thapaled (prounity)

faction of the CPNRevolutionary

Maoist, Baidya claimed that Prachanda’s unification efforts were a ploy to rid Nepal’s
Communist movement of revolutionary ideology, which Baidya accuses Prachanda and
Bhattarai of straying from after coming to power (British Broadcasting Company 2012:
Sedhai 2016; Himalayan Times 2016b).
While standard explanations point towards ideological differences being the
basis of the BaidyaPrachanda split, other literature suggests that the split was about the
control of state power and wealth in the hands of Prachanda (Dixit 2012). While it is
alleged that Prachanda tried to delay the splits for as long as possible, neither him nor

8

During this time, the CPNMaoist Center was still formally named the United Communist Party of
Nepal Maoist.
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Bhattarai were willing to relinquish their positions as chairman and Prime Minister, a
contingency for Baidya’s unity. Furthermore, both Baidya and Bhattarai often criticized
Prachanda for his monopoly over party resources (Ghimire 2012; Jeevan 2013). In
2011, Baidya released a 18point leaflet accusing Prachanda of:
(1) Eclecticism in philosophy. (2) On the political front, is seen moving
toward rightist reformism and national capitulationism from his centrist
opportunism. (3) Prachanda recognizes that party’s prime contradiction
lay with India, its agents and the local feudal forces, but in practice he
is acting just the otherwise. (4) Prachanda focuses on cooperating with
the local forces that favor Indian expansionism and its agents in Nepal.
(5) Verbally Prachanda stresses on cooperation with nationalists,
communists and republicans but in practice he has been cooperating
with the Indian expansionists and their cohorts. (6) At a time when our
territories are being continuously encroached upon and demographic
invasion is taking place, Dahal has made the citizenship distribution
process flexible. (7) Prachanda has supported Indian investments in
Upper Karnali and ArunIII hydropower projects. (8) Prachanda is
impeding party’s fraternal relations with international revolutionary
forces, whereas he has also been maintaining relations with class
enemies more so, Indian intelligence agents. (9) On the issue of
financial discipline, [Prachanda] is seen tilted toward corruption.
[Prachanda] is seen having the tendency of doing anything — both
moral and immoral — for the sake of power, money and prestige. (10)
Prachanda has deliberately left the party without an accounting system
and misused financial means and resources in an individualistic way.
(11) Prachanda deviated from the party’s ideological goals by not
launching appropriate programs to counter the party’s principal enemy
India. (12) Despite being said that we would go for a federal system
with autonomy to ethnicities, [Prachanda] has emphasized unitary and
centralized system. (13) Financial irregularities and misuse of
resources. (14) Selfcentric individualistic tendency, intolerance toward
those holding dissent abusing his power to silence their voices. (15)
Fascist tendency: extending relations with the Indian intelligence
agencies. (16) Disarming the PLA and emptying the cantonments in the
name of “regrouping” without forging a national security policy,
controlling the open border and setting up a border security force. (17)
Bourgeois theory of separation of power, and to minimize the
participation of people in the judiciary under the pretext of judicial
independence, instead of empowering the People´s Assembly. (18)
Agreeing to make appointments of judges by a commission, not by the
federal assembly as demanded by the party (Next Front 2015; Nepali
Times 2011).
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In the 18point leaflet, two of the 18 accusations against Prachanda explicitly support
the explanation that the BaidyaPrachanda split was a product of ideological
differences,9 with many—if not all—of Baidya’s accusations having the ability to be
streamlined to fit into the category of ideological differences. Additionally, two of the 18
accusations also suggest that monopolization of power and resources10 and corruption
could have also been potential reasons for Baidya (and Bhattarai) splitting with the
CPNMaoist Center (Ghimire 2012; Jeevan 2013).

❖

BhattaraiPrachanda Split

A week after splitting with the CPNMaoist Center11, Bhattarai spoke at an interaction
program at Gorkha headquarters, detailing his plan to form a “new political force”
launch an “economic revolution” in Nepal (Himalayan Times 2015c). According to
Bhattarai, “[He] did not want to split the party. [He] just [wanted] to constitute a new
political force” (Himalayan Times 2015b). Yet, it is suggested that the split was highly
anticipated; since 2012, Bhattarai has been advocating for “leadership of a new type”
(Sharma 2016). The break was delayed due to the prolongment of the constitution
drafting process, which Bhattarai is said to have been the breaking point for the Maoist
insurgency leader (Agence FrancePresse 2016). According to Bhattarai, the failure of
the constitution to address the demands brought forth from agitating parties, had created
an atmosphere of political instability in Nepal (Himalaya Times 2015). In turn, Bhattarai
has said his “new political force” will “fulfill the hope of justice, equality, freedom,

9

See points 1 and 2.
See points 9, 17 and 18.
11
During this time, the CPNMaoist Center was still formally named the United Communist Party of
Nepal Maoist.
10
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identity, liberty and [economic] prosperity of the people” (Agence FrancePresse
2016).
Prachanda and Bhattarai are said to have disagreed on many essential issues
concerning political line and party ideology, throughout their underground days.
Prachanda’s loyalists are said to have often accused Bhattarai of trying to “oust”
Prachanda ideologically (Sharma 2016).
During Bhattarai’s prime ministership, his main goal was to carry out an
“economic and social revolution.” Many of Bhattarai’s former Maoist comrades
accused him of pushing forward a neoliberalist agenda when he signed the Bilateral
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) with India, against the
decision of the CPNMaoist Center (Sigh 2011). Under the BIPPA agreement,
“workers basic rights and protections [are] waived within ‘special economic zones’...the
right of the state to support and promote domestic enterprise...the right of workers to
struggle against mistreatment or for basic livelihood and adequate working conditions”
are all traded, to “bring in investment” which Bhattarai said was in the best interests of
Nepal (Des Chene 2014).
After his stint as Prime Minister, Bhattarai redirected all of his energy into his
new political party, gathering over 100 entrepreneurs, industrialists, bankers and traders
together, laying out his party’s economic agenda. During this conference, Bhattarai said
his new political platform would have “socialist orientation.” Simultaneously, Bhattarai
urged the private sector not be concerned with the use of the word “socialism” in the
preamble of the constitution saying, “‘Even China defines itself as socialist through its
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constitution, but it is practicing capitalism’” (Himalayan Times 2015c). In the aftermath,
Prachanda has accused Bhattarai of “joining hands with the Bourgeoisies,” saying:
Baburam Bhattarai was head of the people’s government during the
war and his orders were behind people’s sacrifices and the changes in
this country. So, he will not be free of accountability just by saying that
he has now taken another path. Therefore, I urge him to join the new
Maoist force rather than promote the bourgeoisies...unification is
necessary to take what we have started to a logical end (Khatiwada
2016).

Since leaving the CPNMaoist Center, it seems that Bhattarai has renounced
communist ideology saying, “There is no alternative to capitalism in today’s world and
we have to follow that...I have to unlearn what I’ve learnt in 40 years and learn
something new” (Himalayan Times 2015c). It can be said that it is unclear what
Bhattarai means by, “I have to unlearn what I’ve learnt...and learn something new,” as
his rhetoric often contradicts itself (eg. “socialist orientation” vs. “...no alternative to
capitalism”). However, despite Bhattarai’s use communist terms like “socialist” to
describe his political platform, the majority of his rhetoric suggests that his platform
mimics a more neoliberal—and therefore anticommunist—ideology.
Similarly to the BaidyaPrachanda split, ideology factored into Bhattarai’s
decision to split with the Prachandaled CPNMaoist Center. Given Bhattarai’s public
renouncement of communist ideology, I argue that ideological differences was a core
contributor to his split with the CPNMaoist Center. Furthermore, sources suggest that
Bhattarai had been planning to split with the CPNMaoist Center for a while—in hopes
of carving an independent path for himself— indicating that personal interests may have
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been an underlying reason of why Bhattarai split with the Prachandaled party. Finally,
Bhattarai frequently proposing that his party will be a catalyst for “economic revolution”
and “prosperity,” through his party’s economic agenda, which differs in many ways from
the original objective of the Maoist insurgency—to establish socialism in
Nepal—suggesting that Bhattarai’s agenda has shifted from his former comrades
(Himalayan Times 2015; Agence FrancePresse 2016)

Research Methodology
In order to understand the factions between Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda,
Bhattarai and Baidya, I employed semistructured personal interview surveys of
political party leaders, midlevel cadres12 and political scientists. All interviews were
conducted in Kathmandu, over the course of two weeks. Participants were chosen
using opportunity sampling, conducted in a twotiered manner. The firsttier of
participants were selectively chosen13 based on their availability, willingness and ability
to enhance understanding of the study topic. Using the same technique, the secondtier
of participants were chosen based on references from participants in the firsttier. My
chosen method comes directly from the exploratory nature of this study and the lack of
indepth and critical sources on postwar Maoist parliamentary politics in Nepal.
Furthermore, both qualitative and quantitative methods of data interpretation14 are
employed to establish causal linkages between the splits amongst Prachanda, Bhattarai
and Baidya, factionalism within the CPNMaoist Center and Nepalese politics.
12

In this study, I define cadres as both members and (low to midlevel) workers of a communist
organization.
13
A list of intended interview participants was created, from which the first tier of interview
participants were chosen.
14
See Data Analysis Methodology section.
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❖

Participant Political Affiliation

While all interview participants have some form of background in Nepalese politics,
there are two strata of respondents; firststratum and secondstratum. The
firststratum of respondents are those who are affiliated15 with a political party and
working within a party as a political leader or midlevel cadre. The secondstratum, are
those who are not affiliated with a political party and who had never worked within a
party. Four out of five participants were politically affiliated, with three out of the four
participants belonging to NSN and the final firststratum participant belonging to the
CPNMaoist Center (see Figure 1).

❖

Personal Interview Surveys Methodology

All interview participants were given the choice of their preferred interview location,
with the hopes that if respondents chose their preferred interview location, they would
be more comfortable and open during the interview process.

All firststratum16

respondents’ preferred interview location was their political party headquarters, while
the secondstratum preferred his residence. All respondents were formally interviewed
one time17, with the average interview lasting 48 minutes. With participant consent, all
interviews were recorded for transcription and analysis purposes. During the interview,
additional notes were taken using a laptop. All interviews were semistructured,
meaning some questions were predetermined (with respect to the participant’s relation
to the study topic), with additional probing (based on the content of participant
responses) taking place. Four out of five interviews were conducted individually (eg.

15

I define affiliation as being a member or supporter of a specific political party.
See Participant Political Affiliation section.
17
If additional information was needed, respondents were reached contacted via email or phone.
16
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one interviewer/one participant), with one out of five interviews being conducted
dyadically18 (one interviewer/two participants) (see Figure 2). Additionally, four out of
five interviews were conducted in English, with one out of five interviews being
conducted in a mixture of Nepali and English, at the request of the respondent (see
Figure 3). This latter interview was recorded and later translated into English, with the
help of a translator.

❖

Data Analysis Methodology

The collected interviews were listened to, transcribed and then coded using an a priori
code and emergent code hybrid model. All a priori codes are derived from review of
literature, from which the conceptual framework, which are shifts in ideology, shifts in
agenda and corruption was derived (see Table 1).
Table 1. Operational Definitions of A priori Codes

A priori code s

Ope rational De finitions

Shifts in ideology

Changes or differences in system of ideas forming the basis of
political or economic theory or policy.

Shifts in agenda

Changes or differences in motives, objectives or end goals.

Corruption

Abuse of political power, primarily for private gain.

Note: This table has been constructed to show the operational definitions of the a priori codes
used in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and research findings.

After conducting a thematic analysis of the collected interview data, the emergent codes
that arose are power and clientelism (see Table 2). Emergent codes were marked,
based on the frequency of which they appeared in the data, with subject matter

18

This variation is due to an unforeseen scheduling difficulty, in which the only solution—at the
request of the participants—was a dyadic interview.
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mentioned by two or more participants being marked as an emergent code. The codes
that were most frequently mentioned by multiple respondents and given greater
emphasis, were noted as the plausible explanations. The coded responses were then
triangulated to minimize the chance of a partial, mistaken or biased analysis.
Table 2. Emergent Codes and Associated Concepts

Eme rge nt Code s
Power
Clientelism

Associate d Conce pts

Power, position, personal interests.
Close relationships, fixed system, lack of meritocracy.

Note: This table has been constructed to show the emergent codes and the associated concepts
from which they arose in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and
research findings.

❖

Limitations of Study

Interview Sample Size

Data were collected using opportunity sampling, with the duration of data collection
taken place for a two week period. My interview sample size is significantly small at five
responses. Additionally, the collected data is not representative of all the political
factions investigated, as the Baidyaled CPNRevolutionary Maoist declined to take
part in the study. Finally, the party affiliated respondents outnumbered the number of
nonparty affiliated respondents four to one, with NSN politically affiliated participants
represented three out of five participants (see Figure 1).
Lack of Prior Research & Reliable Sources on Topic

Although a lot research has been published on development of the Maoist movement in
Nepal, there is a lack of indepth study on postwar Maoist parliamentary politics, with
factionalism overall being an understudied phenomenon. Furthermore, many of the

20 Mixon

postwar articles available on Maoist factionalism are poorly written, lacking indepth
and critical analysis. However, I mitigate for this deficiency of indepth research, by
means of thoroughly scrutinizing and crossreference with multiple sources.
Heavy Reliance on Qualitative Data

This studies relies heavily on qualitative derived from participant interview surveys. The
subjective nature of this method of data collection, increases the likelihood of response
bias. To minimize the probability of response bias, the use of leading interview questions
are avoided. Likewise, a hybrid coding method is utilized to analyze data, with both
quantitative and qualitative methods of data interpretation used to establish causal
linkages.
Another limitation regarded to reliance on qualitative data is the problem of
reporting on such a sensitive topic. The participant interview survey asked questions
related to corruption and other forms of hypersensitive matters, which tend to be
difficult or uncomfortable people to discuss. However, the study was voluntary.
Participants were also given the freedom to skip questions and end the interview at any
point.

Research Findings

❖

Reasons for Splits Between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya

Shifts in Ideology

The results of the hybrid coding analysis show, shifts in ideology was the factor most
associated with the splits between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. With shifts in
ideology, appearing throughout the responses of three out of five participants. While
power emerged in the responses of three out of five participants as well, shifts in
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ideology was given the most emphasis, often explicitly noted as the primary reason (see
Figure 4). Shifts in agenda were associated with both the BaidyaPrachanda and
BhattaraiPrachanda faction. The most emphasis was given to the role of ideological
shifts in relation to the BhattaraiPrachanda split, with the following excerpts from the
collected responses illustrate how the finding shifts in ideology is presented using
representative quotes from interview participants:

Interviewer: How does [Naya Shakti Nepal] identify politically?
K. De vkota: It is an alternative party: not leftist, rightist, communist,
noncommunist. It is a conventional ideas [kind] of political party. The ideas, only
[...] could divide the society, they could not produce the solution. That's why, we
came to the conclusion that...capitalism, socialism, communism, anticommunism,
Marxist, nonMarxist they [...] divide the society. We need to have a kind of
solution. That's why we created an alternative party. Alternative party is…an
idea. The idea is not following debate and discussion, but for solution. That's why
this is a solution oriented party.
Interviewer: If we can go back to the ideology of Naya Shakti Nepal. You said, it's
not left or right, but it is a frontist alternative party. What exactly does that mean?
K. De vkota: Until now, everybody will ask, "You are leftist, you are rights, you
are communist, you are noncommunist?” It is because the tradition and tendency
of the formation of the party is the same. That's why, this is a very genuine
question...If you fix yourself in one ideology, the ideology will be static. A fast
moving society and static ideology will be a contradiction. It will never serve. For
a fast moving society, the ideology also has to be developed. If you are not willing
and able to develop the ideology, rather you stuck on the old world  18th, 19th
and 20th century ideology  is it possible to solve the problem of the 21st century?
No, that's why...the ideology has to be developed, with the fast moving society.
That's why we are not confined to any kind of ideology.
Interviewer: So, it's a mixture of ideologies?
K. De vkota: [pointing at feet] Let's say, this is the left [points at left foot] and
this is the right [points at right foot]. If you try to walk with only your left leg,
accidents will happen. Same thing if you try with only your right, same thing will
happen. Left and right! If you want to move forward, walk left and right! Left
and right! That is the frontist, development of ideology, along with the fast moving
society.
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Me: Do you ever see Naya Shakti Nepal reuniting with the CPNMC?
K. De vkota: I don't think so. It is because of ideological things. [...] if
[CPNMC] thought that, "Oh, the situation has already been changed,
continuation of the destruction oriented—struggle oriented party—will no longer
work" and changed their mind and join[ed] with us, maybe. Otherwise, we are
here. We don't have any plans to shift to the MC. But MC people...if they thought
that the right analysis—concrete analysis—of the concrete situation, which is the
core value of Marxism...if they came closer to that point, they would change and
they would join us. Otherwise...not possible. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal
Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)
Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a
negative one.
G. Thapa: [...] Since the formation of communist parties, they weren't even
united ideologically. There was division from the very beginning  proChina,
proRussia and other factions. [There was a] ProIndian faction also…. At that
time, there was also ideological differences also.
Interviewer: …[You mentioned] the Maoist [Center] have disappointed a lot of the
country...do you see more people becoming royalist, wishing that the monarchy was
back?
G. Thapa: ...I don't even think that these Maoist [Center] will come as a big
party. The problem we still have is that things are divided by ideological and
political polarization [in reference to Prachanda, Bhattarai, Baidya and other
Maoist parties]. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey, November 11, 2016)
Interviewer: Prachanda, Baidya and Bhattarai agreed on everything ideological
[during the insurgency?
D. Gurung: During the insurgency they all agreed, but later things changed.
When it came to the process, while they all had similar thoughts, they did not
completely agree on everything. Yet, there were not fractions like now. It was
after the peace agreement things slowly began to fall apart. The problem between
Between Prachanda and Baidya, the problem was that the system should have
been changed but it wasn't. The monarchy was gone, which was positive but
other things in the system didn't change, like there still isn't a republic established
and Baidya wasn't happy about this. Secondly, we were against semicolonialism,
but even after the monarchy was gone semicolonialism had not ended. In fact,
semicolonialism grew and grew, now it's a new colonialism, with Indian
expansionism dominating Nepal. Things are not going in the right way. There is a
lot of compromising going on in the new government, that was Baidya's criticism
against Prachanda. But Bhattarai had very different thoughts. He thought Nepal
became liberal, because the monarchy was gone and Nepal became democratic.
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Some of Prachanda's thoughts used to match Baidya's and some of his thoughts
used to match Bhattarai's, he walked a centrists line. It was difficult to unify
because of Baidya's different thoughts, Prachanda's centrist thoughts and
Bhattarai's strange thoughts.
Interviewer: In your opinion why did Bhattarai and Baidya split with the CPNMC?
D. Gurung: According to Bhattarai he has quit communist philosophy. He does
not believe in it and is not following communist philosophy anymore. He does not
believe in MarxismLeninismMaoism anymore, that is why he is not in a
communist party. But Baidya still keeps saying that we should follow communist
philosophy. In the present situation unification between Prachanda and Baidya
could happen, because Baidya still follows communist philosophy.
Interviewer: In your opinion are there any other reasons why they split [with the
CPNMC]?
D. Gurung: There might be secondary reasons, but the main reason was
because of ideology.
Interviewer: Do you ever see Baidya and Bhattarai reuniting with CPNMC?
D. Gurang: Between Baidya and Bhattarai there is a possibility of unity. But it is
less of a possibility in Bhattarai's situation, because Bhattarai is not following any
communist philosophy. Yet, I believe in he realizes his mistake, rethinks and
revises his decision to not follow communist philosophy it may be possible. So far
he has not done this, so I do not think he will return. He is still saying he quit
MarxismLeninismMaoism. If this is the case, than it is not possible. (Dev
Gurung, Personal Interview Survey, November 17, 2016)

Power

Power was the second factor most associated with the factions between Prachanda,
Bhattarai and Baidya. Power appeared throughout the responses the same amount of
participants as shifts in ideology did. The fundamental difference was that less
emphasis was placed on power as the source the splits, with power often emerging
after shifts in ideology and in a few cases shifts in agenda (see Figure 4). The
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following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding power is
presented using representative quotes from interview participants:
Interviewer: Can you explain more about those characteristics [by Prachanda
during the time of the insurgency]?
K. De vkota: [...] Dr. Bhattarai was always thinking about democracy, economic
prosperity and the upliftment of the condition of the people...Prachanda—
unfortunately —was very focused on power. During, that time monarchy was in
power. Once the monarchy took over, even during that time, Dr. Bhattarai always
focused on the three issues I've already mentioned...Prachanda said that, “Oh,
power is very near to monarchy. Compromise with the monarchy and we can
grab the power. Politics for the power." Dr. Bhattarai said that it would be a
critical mistake.
Interviewer: You said a couple of times that Bhattarai was focused on democracy
and Prachanda was focused on power. [...] What kind of power was Prachanda
focused on?
K. De vkota: In our context [...] position always attracts power, respect,
money—everything. Position. That's why everyone is a 'famous position' mongler.
[...]That's why Prachanda thought that, at any cost we need to be in power. If—
according to Prachanda—[...] if we changed the party, if we changed the agenda,
than there will be no guaranteed to be in a position of power. If position is lost,
than everything will be lost. No money. No respect. No power. That's the thing.
Interviewer: Do you ever see Naya Shakti Nepal reuniting with the CPNMC?
K. De vkota: I don't think so. [...] Prachanda and UCPNMC which very much
focus on power, position and continuation of the same party, that felt pride that
this is the party who fought against the monarchy, who achieved the republic,
fought against the authoritarian government and achieved federalism. That's why
they are very much proud of that party. They don't want to change! (Khimlal
Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)
Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a
negative one.
G. Thapa: [...] The Maoist came as a force in 1996, when several factions united
to become one Maoist party [in reference to the CPNMC] and then they started
the Maoist movement. During that time also, there were different factions within
the party, led by Baidya, led by Bhattarai, led by Prachanda and other small
groups when they united. But, in the eyes it was not divided before 2006. So there
were proIndian, proNepali and these kinds of things. When they [in reference to
Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya led CPNMC] came to power...you know that
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when a party comes to power, you know that there will be problems? Everyone
wants to be in power, to be minister or something like that. So it was not an
ideological division as such, I don't think. [...] First, when Baidya splitted there
was a problem of money. The Maoist accumulated huge amounts of money from
local sources  capturing and killing many people  and encroaching many
properties on the village level. All the money was in Prachanda's name. [...] One
of the reasons they splitted were for power. Second, was for wealth.. [...]
Basically, not ideological differences. I think in Nepal there are not ideologically
decorated—of course there are ideologies—but they never followed this Marxist,
Leninist and Maoist. Right now they have a lot of explaining to do, they have lots
of money, power and some kind of relations. They do not drink any local drinks
here; they go only for scott drinks or high level drinks. Basically, it was not
ideological and was not purely for power. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview
Survey, November 11, 2016)
Interviewer: In your opinion are there any other reasons why [Prachanda,
Bhattarai and Baidya split]?
D. Gurung: There might be secondary reasons [...] it could have been because
of personal egos, like who is getting what position in government. Third, individual
interests. But those are small reasons, the main reason is because of ideology.
(Dev Gurung, Personal Interview Survey, November 17, 2016)

Shifts in Agenda

The results of the hybrid coding analysis indicate that shifts in agenda was another
secondary factor which contributed splits between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya.
Shifts in agenda were reflected in the responses of by two out of five interview
participants, coming third in terms of its predominance in the collected data (see
Figure 4). Shifts in agenda were only mentioned by respondents affiliated with the
Bhattarailed Naya Shakti Nepal. Shifts in agenda were only mentioned in relation to
the BhattaraiPrachanda faction. The following excerpts from the collected responses
illustrate how the finding shifts in agenda is presented using representative quotes from
interview participants:
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Interviewer: Can you explain more about those characteristics [by Prachanda
during the time of the insurgency]?
K. De vkota: Yea. Basically, Dr. Bhattarai was always thinking about
democracy, economic prosperity and the upliftment of the condition of the people.
These are the issues, democracy, development and improved conditions. These
three issues, related with the democracy and democratic parties very close to
democratic parties. Prachanda —unfortunately—was very focused on power.
During, that time monarchy was in power. Once the monarchy took over, even
during that time, Dr. Bhattarai always focused on the three issues I've already
mentioned, democracy, development and economic prosperity. Prachanda said
that oh, "power is very near to monarchy. Compromise with the monarchy and
we can grab the power. Politics for the power." Dr. Bhattarai said that it would be
a critical mistake.
Interviewer: ...why did you leave (CPNMC)?
K. De vkota: ...In the Nepalese context, one to three. First, the agenda of the
politics has been changed, after the promulgation of the constitution…[and] the
agenda changed. Second[ly]...Nepalese politics has been starting to fight against
the establishment, for the struggle, for the movement, for the dismantling of the
establishment. But, right now...is already started for construction... development,
second reason. Third reason, we fought against the system...Now, we need to
fight against the condition of the people. So, by these [...] reason...agenda of the
politics have already been changed [...]. Now, this is a completely new situation
and with a new situation, old political parties and a continuation of the old
conventional political party will not work. Let's say UCPNMaoist, why we [in
reference to him and Bhattarai] split? UCPNMaoist was funded to fight against
the establishment, fight against the monarchy, fight against the authoritarian
system, fight against the exclusionary system, the Hindu kingdom [...]. Now,
everything we have achieved and again, continuation of the same party doesn't
make any sense. An objective of the foundation of the UCPNMaoist was
different...to fight, to dismantle, to remove. Again, continuation of the party means
again agenda must be a continuation...Now, the [...] agenda has also already
changed. So, we need to have a new political party and what we [in reference to
him and Bhattarai] tried first, we tried our best to change the whole party from
destruction to construction, development and economic development, first. We
failed. Secondly, we tried with like minded people within the party, we tried our
best. Second, we succeeded. Some of us were within the party of the
UCPNMaoist, like minded people we came out and we started. [...] It is not
actually splitting, it is a new initiation ...new initiation of the political party for
economic prosperity. [...]Not only UCPNMaoist, all the other political parties
also, they never talked about development. They never talked about economic
prosperity, but now the major agenda is economic prosperity, for that purpose we
need to have a fresh political party. That's why we started [Naya Shakti Nepal].
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Interviewer: It seems that Prachana and Bhattarai had a lot of ideological
disagreements from the beginning, so why do you think Bhattarai stayed with the
CPNMC so long?
K. De vkota: [...] Actually, it's not a rivalry, the major understanding was that
after the promulgation of the constitution, the agenda of the party would be
changed. By changing the agenda, the agendabased party would also need to be
changed. That was a basic and tacit understanding between Prachanda and Dr.
Bhattarai and it was endorsed in our party [in reference to the CPNMC]
document also. But, when the promulgation of the constitution, Prachanda was
very much a powermonger. He felt power would be safe in continuation of the
situation and party. Bhattarai said that, "Whatever safe or not doesn't matter. This
is the right time to change the party's structure—objective—because the agenda
has changed. The situation has been changed, that's why Dr. Bhattarai and we
thought that with the promulgation of the constitution, this is the right time to
initiate a new phase of political party and a new kind of political party, with a new
agenda. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)
Interviewer: Why did you decided to join to Naya Shakti over the CPNMC, seeing
how you were never politically affiliated until now?
R. Dhake l: [...] the agenda of the other party was to form the constitution in
their favor, so we [in reference to Naya Shakti political leaders and cadres] see
no vision in the party now for further development. So, that was the peak of the
party's agenda because that was the major agenda they have taken when they
started. So when they reached their agenda, that was one level fulfilled. We don't
see that they can go any further now, because that was the only agenda at the
central level that they were proposing and when it was met, there was a
derailment about what next action they should take. (Revat Dhakel, Personal
Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)

❖

Negative Results

Corruption

Contrary to my working hypotheses derived from my conceptual framework (eg.
corruption as a potential factor of BaidyaPrachanda split), corruption did not emerge
in the collected data as potential reason for the BaidyaPrachanda split or the
BhattaraiPrachanda split. Alternatively, corruption arose as a theme within
CPNMaoist Center party politics as a whole. CPNMaoist Center party corruption
was mentioned in the responses of three out of five interview participants (see Figure
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4). The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding
corruption is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:

Interviewer: So a lot of people [...] suggest that the Maoist are corrupt [and that]
they no longer practice revolutionary ideology, they are now like the bourgeois...To
what extent do you [find this to be] true.
K. De vkota: [Devkota chuckled] Million dollar questions. Actually, during the
time of 2000, one document has been passed, "Development of Democracy in
21st Century". [...] In this document  it's a very short document  in this
document it says that if the party is not controlled by the people, the party will be
corrupt and it will take an autocratic form. [...] Then after, people became
corrupt, autocratic and they always focused on power, rather than people's
prosperity and economic development and the country's best interest...and that's
the truth. Two things, when we came into power―being the largest party―then
issues came up. Inside and outside two issues came up, cantonment…almost
thirty plus thousand PLA were confined in a cantonment and the government had
supplied money for feeding them and the corruption happened with that money.
Another issue came up, with all the Maoist [Center] party leaders during the
peace process and when they came to power, they became corrupt. Rampant
issues came up. The party itself initiated and formed two separate commissions,
in the party. One led by [...] responsible for investigating the cantonment issues.
Another, by [...] responsible for investigating the property of the party leaders.
Both commission reports almost identified the corrupt people and corruption. Time
and again, they insured they would be punished, but it never happen. Now, the
commission report is nowhere. [...] gentleman he died, he is no more now and the
commission report is also no longer public. It is not me saying this, it is what the
report says. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)
Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a
negative one.
G. Thapa: [...] when Baidya splitted there was a problem of money. The Maoist
accumulated huge amounts of money from local sources―capturing and killing
many people― and encroaching many properties on the village level. [...] All the
money was in Prachanda's name. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey,
November 11, 2016)
Interviewer: What part if any does corruption play in Nepalese politics and Maoist
party politics?
D. Gurung: Even in this communist party [in reference to CPNMaoist Center,
people aren't able to be true communist. So those who aren't real communist, they
might be corrupt. It's an individual problem, not a communist party problem. The
people we have guided in this party accept communist philosophy and practice it.
[...] In general, many people say they are communist but do not practice as a
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communist should, they prioritize their personal interests. Those people in the
party [in reference to CPNMaoist Center] might act corruptly. (Dev Gurung,
Personal Interview Survey, November 17, 2016)

❖

Nepalese Political Culture

The primary objective of this study was to identify the causes of the factions between
Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. Thus, participant interview
survey questions were formed with this objective at the core. Participant responses that
aligned with the primary objective had predominance in the collected data. The second
most predominant responses appertaining to the general nature of Nepalese political
culture, in which power and clientelism are reflected within the collected data (see
Figure 4).
Power

Power was the emergent code reflected in the collected data, with three out of five
respondent's reference power in the general context of political culture in Nepal (see
Figure 4). The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the
finding power is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:
Interviewer: You said a couple of times that Bhattarai was focused on
democracy and Prachanda was focused on power. [...] What kind of power was
Prachanda focused on?
K. Devkota: [laughs] In our [in reference to Nepali politics] context,
position...position always attracts power, respect, money  everything. Position.
That's why everyone is a “famous position” mongler. If I am in position, you
came to me [laughs]...anybody of respect would be comfortable to give respect
to me and then anybody else will come with me, with money also. That's a basic
tendency of the Nepali politics. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey,
November 10, 2016)
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Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or
a negative one.
G. Thapa: [...] you know that when a party comes to power, you know that
there will be problems? Everyone wants to be in power, to be minister or
something like that. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey, November 11,
2016)
Interviewer: What part if any does corruption play in Nepalese politics and
Maoist Center party politics?
D. Gurung: Communist philosophy is anticorruption. Communist philosophy is
against corruption, but all people can't be communist. Even in the communist
party, people aren't able to be true communist. So those who aren't real
communist, they might be corrupt. It's an individual problem, not a communist
party problem. The people we have guided into this party accept communist
philosophy and practice it. So it depends on how many people accept and
follow communist philosophy. In the communist party's philosophy it says the
party should not be corrupt. But the corruption in it is connected to private
properties and individual interests amongst communist leaders. Communist
philosophy should be ranked higher than personal interests in the party. In
general, many people say they are communist but do not practice as a
communist should. They prioritize their personal interests… (Dev Gurung,
Personal Interview Survey, November 17, 2016)
Clientelism

Finally, clientelism was the second most predominant emergent code reflected in the
collected data. The theme of clientelism emerged in the responses of two out of the
five interview survey participants, in association with political culture in Nepal (see
Figure 4). The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the
finding clientelism is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:
Interviewer: I've read, along with the corruption that is found in Nepalese politics,
many articles say that clientelism one of them. How have you seen this played out
in parliamentary politics?
K. De vkota: [...] Our conclusion is that Nepalese political parties change—not
as a change agent—into a center of corruption. MC now has 200..2,000 plus
central committee members. The central committee members decided that they
are not allowed to work. They are not allowed to work. It means the party will
feed them. The party doesn't have any income. The party exploits the
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commission. The party nominates some of them to state power, they will feed the
party cadres, some commission agents, some tenders, some bureaucrats, some
businessmen with whom they have those type of relationships with and they will
feed them. That means corruption—center of corruption. The political parties
have come a center of corruption. We [in reference to Naya Shakti Nepal] came
to conclusion that this is the main problem and correction needs to start from
ourself, from the political parties itself, political leaders themselves. That's why
we started being transparent. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey,
November 10, 2016)
Interviewer: [You mentioned] the Maoist have disappointed a lot of the country...
do you see more people becoming royalist, wishing that the monarchy was back?
G. Thapa: In India there are good things. In India—when I was there— there is
a fixed system. The senior most person will be the principal, whoever he or she
may be. The next senior most will be the viceprincipal. There is no politics!
Senior most in the department will be the head of the department. It will be for
two years. After two years, the next senior most will be the head of the
department. This system was introduced by the British in India. In every field
also, if there are competent persons within the institution bring them up! But right
now, what is happening [in reference to political happenings in Nepal] is if you
have a very close relationship with your resource minister you will be the
electricity board chairman, without having any experience. So we have to
discourage any political appointment in technical fields.
Interviewer: Do you think clientelism plays a role in Nepalese politics?
G. Thapa: This is very sad one of the very biggest factors is also is
clientelism...doing for the...house and horse! First house, family, relatives,
nephews, brother and sisterinlaw. They want to give some kind of benefits and
post. For example, the son of Prachanda is the also the secretary of Prachanda.
The prime minister's son, is the secretary of the prime minister. This kind of
clientelism is there. This is one of the big problems! First, house and horse means
that they want to make money for themselves. Second, the want to make money
for the party. Third, they want to give the pride to their followers. This has been
happening since 1990, this isn't a new thing here. Even before 1990 it was a
oneparty system, where certain people benefitted. After that also, those who
were related to the leaders and the party… (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview
Survey, November 11, 2016)

Discussion/Analysis

❖

Patterns in Data & Implications of Research Findings

Shifts in ideology was the a priori code most associated with the factions between
Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. This finding supports the working hypothesis (eg.
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shifts in ideology as a primary factor), derived from the study’s conceptual framework
based on

the analytical hypothesis presented by Sharma (2016), Sedhai (2016)

Himalayan Times (2015c) and (2016b). In the collected data, shifts in ideology were
presented with more emphasis in relation to the BhattaraiPrachanda split, than the
BaidyaPrachanda, though the data shows ideological differences played a role in both
splits. I contend the reason for this nuance is due to the drastic switch in Bhattarai’s
ideological orientation. Unlike Prachanda and Baidya,

who profess to follow the

communist ideology of MarxismLeninismMaoism, Bhattarai has renounced communist
ideology entirely. Instead, practicing—what has been described by NSN party
spokesman Khimlal Devkota as— “frontist” ideology (Khimlal Devkota, Personal
Interview Survey, November 10, 2016).

Power was allocated as a secondary reason for the factions between
Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. Although monopolization of power was proposed
earlier in the study as a potential factor, based on the information dispensed in Gilmore
(2012) and (Jeevan 2013), power was not added to the conceptual framework of the
study. This decision was made due to the articles’ partisan presentation of information.
In spite of this, power was a common theme that emerged from the data. While power
was a significant theme referenced in context to Nepalese political culture, it was mostly
emphasized specifically in the context of the BhattaraiPrachanda faction by interview
survey participant Khimlal Devkota. While Devkota’s alignment with Bhattarai (and
NSN) must be taken into consideration when evaluating his claims against Prachanda,
his characterization of Prachanda as a “powermonger,” corresponds with Gilmore
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(2012) and Jeevan (2013), which states that Baidya and Bhattarai often criticized
Prachanda for his monopoly over party resources.
Shifts in agenda was another secondary factor associated with factions
between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, coming emerging as third in terms of its
predominance in the collected data. This finding supports the working hypothesis (eg.
shifts in agenda as a potential factor of the BhattaraiPrachanda split), based on
information presented in Himalayan Times (2015) and Agence FrancePresse (2016).
All responses coded for shifts in agenda were acquired from NSN affiliated
participants, affirming that shifts in agenda was a factor specific to the faction between
Bhattarai and Prachanda.

Conclusion

❖

Suggestions for Future Research

Much research remains to be done of topics related factionalism, in the Nepalese
context.While my researched touched upon this issue, the complexity of this subject
matter calls greater indepth analysis. Future works includes, a comparative indepth
study of factionalism with respect to Maoist oriented parliamentary political parties in
Nepal. While each Maoist parliamentary party can be studied separately at each node,
understanding factionalism within Nepalese revolutionary politics requires an indepth
historical examination of Maoist political parties individually, in relation to each other and
the greater Nepalese political system as a whole.

❖

Summary

This study is a product of the analyzation of factionalism between the Maoist insurgency
orchestrators Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. While standard explanations attributed
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the splits to ideological difference or shifts in ideology: power and shifts in agenda
was found to have influenced the factionalism between Bhattarai, Baidya and the
Prachandaled CPNMaoist Center. Shifts in ideology was found to be the primary
reason for the BaidyaPrachanda split, power playing less of a significant role in the
split, with shifts in agenda not indicated to have been a factor in Baidya’s decision to
leave the CPNMaoist Center. On the contrary, shifts in agenda was the primary
reason why Bhattarai split with the Prachandaled CPN Maoist Center, followed by
shifts in ideology and power.
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Glossary of Terms
Nom de guerre: an assumed name under which a person engages in combat or some
other activity or enterprise

Panchayat raj: the political system of Nepal from 1960’s to 1990’s. In Nepal, the
panchayat system had four tiers, functioning at the village, town, district and national
level. Traditionally, each castegroup in Nepal would form its own panchayat or
council of elders, with a portion of the assembly members being chosen by the next tier
panchayat , to serve in the following tier panchayat.

Cadres: both members and (low to midlevel) workers of a communist organization.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Tables
Table 1. Operational Definitions of A priori Codes

A priori code s

Ope rational De finitions

Shifts in ideology

Changes or differences in system of ideas forming the basis of
political or economic theory or policy.

Shifts in agenda

Changes or differences in motives, objectives or end goals.

Corruption

Abuse of political power, primarily for private gain.

Note: This table has been constructed to show the operational definitions of the a priori codes
used in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and research findings.

Table 2. Emergent Codes and Associated Concepts

Eme rge nt Code s
Power
Clientelism

Associate d Conce pts

Power, position, personal interests.
Close relationships, fixed system, lack of meritocracy.

Note: This table has been constructed to show the emergent codes and the associated concepts
from which they arose in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and
research findings.
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Appendix 2: Figures
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